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1 Introduction
The financial crisis from 2007-2010 was the worst global economic crisis since the Great
Depression of the 1930s. Most of the world’s largest banks survived only due to un-
precedented bailout measures. G-20 member states contributed US$ 7000 billion to save
system-relevant financial institutions and approved economic stimulus packages worth
US$ 1400 billion in an effort to prevent an ongoing depression. Politicians, economists
and regulators are still searching for measures to prevent such a crisis from recurring.
One prominent proposal is the introduction of bonus taxes for corporate executives.
There are several models of taxing executive compensation in the firms that accepted
large amounts of federal bailout funds. For example, the US House of Representatives
approved a 90% tax on bonuses in such firms. Similarly, Ireland introduced in January
2011 a 90% tax on executives’ bonuses in banks that received government support. More-
over, in the UK, a bonus tax of 50% was imposed on bankers’ bonuses for a period of
several months in 2010. In Switzerland, the Council of States approved a tax on executive
bonuses above CHF 3 million in December 2010.
Despite their political relevance, the economic effects of bonus taxes have received
little attention in academic research. This paper tries to fill this gap by developing basic
insights into the functioning and consequences of bonus taxes on executive pay based on
the seminal principal-agent model of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987). We introduce a tax
that is levied on the agent’s bonus to analyze how it affects the composition of executives’
compensation packages (fixed salary component and pay-performance sensitivity) and
incentives to exert effort. We further investigate how bonus taxes affect bonus payments,
tax revenue and social welfare. The objective of our paper, however, is not to analyze
how a bonus tax influences the risk-taking behavior of corporate executives.
In our model, the principal chooses the fixed salary and the pay-performance sensitiv-
ity by satisfying the agent’s participation constraint and anticipating the agent’s optimal
effort level. For a general effort cost function, the agent reacts to a higher bonus tax with
lower effort, while the behavior of the principal depends on the risk parameter (product
of the agent’s risk aversion and variance in the firm value). Furthermore, a bonus tax
does not necessarily lead to a shift from the pay-performance sensitivity to the fixed
salary component. For instance, a bonus tax can lead to the counterintuitive result that
both the fixed salary component and the pay-performance sensitivity increase. However,
a substitution effect between these components exists for a quadratic effort cost function.
In this case, an increase (decrease) in the pay-performance sensitivity always leads to
a decrease (increase) in the fixed salary component. For quadratic effort costs, we also
find that the agent’s tax-induced effort reduction decreases with a higher risk parameter.
Moreover, a higher bonus tax induces the principal to pay higher bonuses if the risk pa-
rameter is sufficiently high. Finally, the introduction of a bonus tax will decrease social
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welfare unless the social planner puts a sufficiently high weight on tax revenue.
In what follows, we provide a short literature review. In the early 1980s, research on
executive compensation paralleled the emergence and acceptance of agency theory. The
principal-agent problem arises through asymmetric information and diverging interests
between ownership and control. This agency problem was first formalized by Jensen and
Meckling (1976) and subsequently extended in various directions. Seminal papers on this
topic include Mirrlees (1976), Holmstrom (1979, 1982), Fama (1980), Lazear and Rosen
(1981), and Grossman and Hart (1983). The evolving literature on executive compensa-
tion has been highly interdisciplinary and has spanned finance, accounting, economics,
industrial relations, strategy, organizational behavior, and law. For comprehensive sur-
veys of research on executive compensation see Gomez-Mejia et al. (1985), Murphy (1999),
Core et al. (2003), and Devers et al. (2007).
Despite the large body of literature and numerous theoretical and empirical studies
on executive compensation, only a few papers have addressed the consequences of execu-
tive compensation regulation in general and the effects of bonus taxes in particular. For
example, Dew-Becker (2009) reviewed the history of government rules and regulations in
the US that affect executive compensation. By discussing disclosure rules, advancements
in corporate governance, and say-on-pay, Dew-Becker analyzed the evolution of pay reg-
ulation and concluded that mandatory say-on-pay could be the most effective and least
harmful measure of controlling executive compensation. Knutt (2005) examined diverse
regulatory issues from a legal point of view. He claimed that the various attempts to
regulate executive compensation, such as the disclosure and tax regulations, have not yet
been effective.
Hall and Liebman (2000) analyzed the extent to which tax policy influences the com-
position of executive compensation and discussed the consequences of rising stock-based
pay. First, they found that tax rate changes have not played a major role in the dramatic
explosion in executive stock-option pay since 1980. Second, they found evidence that the
million-dollar rule, which limits the corporate deductibility of non-performance-related
executive compensation to US$ 1 million, leads firms to adjust the composition of their
payments towards performance-related pay. Third, they examined whether there is evi-
dence that firms significantly shift the timing of option exercises in response to changes
in tax rates. Unlike Hall and Liebman (2000), who concentrated on a tax on stock-based
pay, we studied a tax that is levied on the agent’s bonus.
Katusˇcˇa´k (2004) focused on the incentives of compensation packages and the conse-
quences of different tax rate implementations by separating the compensation package in
a salary into an option gain and a stock gain component. Based on this framework, a
tax on the entire compensation package decreases the equilibrium effort and the after-tax
pay-performance sensitivity (PPS), and the effect on the pre-tax PPS is ambiguous. In
addition, he empirically investigated variations in personal income tax rates and com-
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bined federal and state tax rates in the US during the period 1992-1996. Contrary to
Katusˇcˇa´k, this study focused on the consequences of a bonus tax levied on the variable
salary. Moreover, our analysis focused on the tax-induced effects on the principal and
agent’s behaviors regarding the composition of the compensation package and effort level.
Radulescu (2010) analyzed the effects of bonus taxes on manager compensation and
welfare. She based her results on a principal-agent model with quadratic effort costs in
a two-country framework and considered two different scenarios for the firm’s relocation
possibilities. She showed that the pay-performance sensitivity always increases in the
country with a bonus tax. Furthermore, the country that does not implement a bonus
tax suffers from lower welfare. If, however, relocation is not possible, welfare in the
tax-free country is higher than it is in the country that has implemented a bonus tax.
Radulescu focused her model on a macroeconomic two-country perspective including
relocation possibilities and concentrated on tax incidence. In contrast, we focused on the
incentive effects of bonus taxes in a microeconomic one-country perspective and showed
how bonus taxes affect the fixed salary and pay-performance sensitivity.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces our principal-
agent model with its main assumptions and notation. It also presents the computations
for the optimality conditions and derives the effects of bonus taxes for a general cost
function. In Section 3, we specify the agent’s cost function and consider quadratic effort
costs. Section 4 extends the analysis for a general polynomial cost function. Finally,
Section 4 discusses the main insights and presents our conclusions.
2 Model
2.1 Notation and Assumptions
Our model is based on the seminal principal-agent model of Holmstrom and Milgrom
(1987) and introduces a tax denoted by τ ∈ (0, 1) that is levied on the agent’s variable
salary (bonus). We consider a single-period employment relationship in a firm between
a risk-neutral principal (e.g., a firm’s owner) and a risk-averse agent (e.g., CEO). The
agent chooses the unobservable action (effort) a ∈ R+0 to produce a firm value given by
x = a + ε, where ε is a normally distributed error term with ε ∼ N(0, σ2ε) representing
potential effects on the firm value beyond the agent’s control. A high variance in the
error term σ2ε can be interpreted as a more uncertain economic environment that creates
a high variance in the firm value or a situation in which the agent’s performance cannot
be measured precisely.
Because the principal can only observe the firm value x, the agent’s effort a cannot
be specified in a legally enforceable contract. The agent’s effort generates costs according
to a strictly convex cost function c(a) with the following properties: c(a) ∈ C3 with
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c′(a) > 0, c′′(a) > 0 for a > 0, c′(0) = 0, c′′(0) = 0 and lim
a→∞
c′(a) =∞.1
In line with the agency literature, we assume that the principal offers the agent a
linear employment contract that generates a payoff to the agent according to2
p(x) ≡ δ + (1− τ)γx = δ + (1− τ)γ(a+ ε),
where δ ∈ R+0 is the fixed salary component and γx is the variable salary or bonus
paid by the principal. We refer to the parameter γ ∈ (0, 1) as the pay-performance
sensitivity (PPS).3 It should be noted that the gross salary paid by the principal is given
by s(x) ≡ δ + γx, and that p(x) = δ + (1 − τ)γx is the net-of-tax salary received by
the agent. We further assume that the agent has an outside option, represented by his
reservation utility û ∈ R+0 . The reservation utility can be interpreted as the utility the
agent would receive in another firm or in a country without a bonus tax. The state
receives the difference between gross and net salary as tax revenue TR ≡ τγx. Because
our study focuses on bonus taxes, we do not consider other taxes such as income taxes
on the agent’s salary.
From the properties of the normal distribution, we derive that the agent’s (net-of-tax)
salary p(x) is also normally distributed with
p(x) ∼ N (δ + (1− τ)γa; (1− τ)2γ2σ2ε) .
Thus, the expected salary of the agent is given by E[p] = δ + (1 − τ)γa ≡ p¯, and the
variance of the salary yields V [p] = (1− τ)2γ2σ2ε ≡ σ2p.
We assume that the agent is risk-averse with a constant absolute risk-averse (CARA)
utility function that is given by the negative exponential function U(p) = −e−rp, where
r ∈ R+ is the Arrow-Pratt measure of the agent’s level of absolute risk aversion. The
expected value of this utility E[U ] yields E[U ] ≡ ∫ U(p)f(p)dp, where f(p) is the proba-
bility density function of p. Because the salary is normally distributed with p ∼ N(p¯, σ2p),
the expected value of the agent’s utility is then given by E[U ] = −e−r(p¯−rσ2p/2). Using
a monotonic transformation, which preserves the ordering, we conclude that the agent’s
1Note that we will require a weaker condition than lim
a→∞ c
′(a) =∞ in our proof for the existence and
uniqueness of the equilibrium.
2Linear contracts are widely used in the literature because of their analytical convenience (see, e.g.,
Feltham and Xie, 1994; Baker, 2002; Hughes et al., 2005). Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) found the
optimal dynamic compensation scheme to be linear. Hellwig and Schmidt (2002) show that the result
of Holmstrom and Milgrom does not only apply to continuous-time but also to discrete-time settings.
Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine (1995) and Kim and Wang (1998) further show that linear contracts can
be an optimal means to resolve double moral hazard problems; Laffont and Tirole (1986) find that linear
contracts can constitute optimal contracts in adverse selection settings.
3Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) predicted that the executive’s pay-performance sensitivity is decreas-
ing in the variance of the firm’s performance. They support strong empirical evidence of this prediction
by using a broad sample of executives at large corporations.
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expected net utility E[UA] (i.e., the certainty equivalent minus costs) yields
4
E[UA] ≡ δ + (1− τ)γa− rσ
2
ε
2
(1− τ)2γ2 − c(a).
The term RP ≡ 1/2rσ2ε(1 − τ)2γ2 is the agent’s risk premium required to compensate
him for the uncertainty in his expected salary.
The principal is assumed to be risk neutral because she is well diversified. Her profit
piP is the difference between firm value and the agent’s gross salary: piP ≡ x − s(x) =
(1− γ)x− δ. Hence, the principal’s expected profit is given by
E[piP ] ≡ (1− γ)a− δ.
Next, we introduce the welfare function. We assume that expected social welfare is
given by a weighted sum of the state’s expected tax revenue and the sum of the agent’s
expected net utility and the principal’s expected profit:
E[W ] ≡ ω · E[TR] + (1− ω) (E[UA] + E[piP ]) , (1)
where ω ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter that allows us to vary the relative importance of the
expected tax revenue and the sum of the agent’s expected net utility and the principal’s
expected profit.
The timing is as follows. In t = 0, the state sets a certain level for the bonus tax
τ ∈ (0, 1) that is levied on the agent’s bonus payment. In t = 1, the principal offers the
agent an employment contract with a fixed salary of δ and a pay-performance sensitivity
of γ. The agent accepts this contract if it guarantees him at least his reservation utility,
which is given by û. In t = 2, after accepting the contract, the agent exerts effort a. In
t = 3, the firm value x is realized, and all the payments are made in t = 4.
2.2 Optimality Conditions and General Results
The agent maximizes his expected net utility E[UA] with respect to the effort level a such
that the maximization problem is given by
max
a≥0
{
E[UA] = δ + (1− τ)γa− rσ
2
ε
2
γ2(1− τ)2 − c(a)
}
.
The principal maximizes her expected profit E[piP ] and solves the following maximization
problem:
max
(δ,γ)≥0
{E[piP ] = (1− γ)a− δ}
4See Appendix A.1 for a detailed derivation of the agent’s expected net utility.
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subject to
E[UA(a
∗)] = δ + (1− τ)γa∗ − rσ
2
ε
2
γ2(1− τ)2 − c(a∗) > û (2)
a∗ ∈ arg max
a≥0
E[UA]. (3)
The first constraint is the participation constraint, which guarantees that the agent re-
ceives at least his reservation utility û. The second constraint represents the incentive
compatibility constraint derived from the agent’s maximization problem.
The following proposition establishes the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium
and presents the optimality conditions deduced from the maximization problems of the
agent and the principal.
Proposition 1 test
(i) The existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium (γ∗, δ∗, a∗) are guaranteed.
(ii) The principal sets the optimal compensation package (γ∗, δ∗) as
γ∗ =
(1− τ)− a∗c′′(a∗)τ
(1− τ) [1 + (1− τ)c′′(a∗)rσ2ε ]
and δ∗ = û− c′(a∗)a∗ + c
′(a∗)2
2
rσ2ε + c(a
∗). (4)
(iii) The agent exerts optimal effort a∗ according to
c′(a∗) = (1− τ)γ∗. (5)
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
According to Proposition 1, a unique equilibrium exists for a general cost function.
The optimal pay-performance sensitivity γ∗, the optimal fixed salary δ∗, and the optimal
effort level a∗ in equilibrium are defined implicitly by equations (4) and (5). The proposi-
tion further shows that the pay-performance sensitivity γ∗ in equilibrium depends on the
following factors: the agent’s absolute risk aversion r, the variance in the firm value σ2ε ,
the curvature of the agent’s effort cost c′′(a∗), the bonus tax τ and the agent’s equilibrium
effort a∗.
For notational simplicity, the parameter ρ stands for the product rσ2ε of the agent’s
level of risk aversion r and the variance in the firm value σ2ε :
ρ ≡ rσ2ε .
We refer to ρ as the ”risk parameter”. If the risk parameter ρ is zero, that is, if there is
no uncertainty in the economic environment such that the variance in the firm value is
zero (σ2ε = 0) and/or the agent is risk neutral (r = 0), then the optimal pay-performance
sensitivity is γ∗ = 1 − a∗c′′(a∗)τ
1−τ . In this scenario, the introduction of a bonus tax always
induces the principal to set a lower pay-performance sensitivity than in a scenario without
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a bonus tax (i.e., γ∗(a∗, τ) < γ∗(a∗, 0) ∀τ ∈ (0, 1)). A converse result can occur in a
scenario with a positive risk parameter (i.e., the introduction of a bonus tax can induce
the principal to set a higher pay-performance sensitivity). We derive this counterintuitive
result in Proposition 2, in which we analyze how a bonus tax τ affects the pay-performance
sensitivity γ∗, the fixed salary δ∗ and the agent’s effort level a∗.
Proposition 2 For a general cost function, a higher bonus tax τ has the following effects
in equilibrium:
(i) The principal increases or decreases the pay-performance sensitivity γ∗ depending on
the following condition:
dγ∗
dτ
R 0⇔ ρ R ργ ≡ c
′′(a∗)(1− (1 + τ)γ∗ + c′′(a∗)a∗)− τγ∗c′′′(a∗)a∗
c′(a∗) [2c′′(a∗)2 + c′(a∗)c′′′(a∗)]
.
(ii) The principal decreases or increases the fixed salary δ∗ depending on the following
condition:
dδ∗
dτ
Q 0⇔ ρ R ρδ ≡ a
∗
c′(a∗)
.
(iii) The agent always reduces equilibrium efforts, i.e., da
∗
dτ
< 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
The proposition shows that the reaction of the principal to a higher bonus tax depends
on the risk parameter ρ, and that the agent always reduces his effort in equilibrium.5
To clarify the intuition behind the principal’s behavior in part (i) of Proposition 2, we
proceed in two steps: (ia) First, we analyze the individual terms of the principal’s first-
order condition to understand her incentives for determining the fixed salary component
and the pay-performance sensitivity. (ib) Second, we explain the effects of a bonus tax
on the individual terms of the principal’s first-order condition.
ad (ia): Recall that the principal maximizes her profit by forming an optimal com-
pensation package based on the conditions that the agent reaches at least his reservation
utility û and the compensation package is incentive compatible. Using the participa-
tion constraint and the incentive compatibility constraint, we rearrange the principal’s
first-order condition and obtain
1︸︷︷︸
MR effect
−
(
γ∗ +
c′′(a∗)a∗
1− τ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
direct MC effect
+ c′′(a∗)a∗ + (1− τ)γ∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
income effect
− ρ(1− τ)γ∗c′′(a∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
risk effect
− (1− τ)γ∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
ind. MC effect
= 0.
(6)
We derive that a one-unit increase in the agent’s effort (induced by a higher pay-performance
sensitivity) has the following effects for the principal:6
5Note that γ∗ and a∗ depend on ρ such that the threshold values ργ and ρδ themselves depend on ρ.
6In equilibrium, the sum of the below-mentioned effects must equal zero.
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• Marginal revenue (MR) effect: One-to-one higher expected revenue, which yields a
marginal revenue of one.
• Direct marginal cost (MC) effect: Higher effort generates higher costs for the prin-
cipal, given by γ∗ + c′′(a∗)a∗/(1 − τ), as she must pay the agent a higher bonus.
The direct marginal cost effect consists of two terms. The first term represents the
higher bonus paid by the principal, induced by a one-unit increase in the agent’s
effort. The second term reflects the effort-induced effect on the pay-performance
sensitivity. It should be noted that a change of the pay-performance sensitivity also
affects the bonus.
• Income effect: Higher effort also implies that there is an income effect for the agent
such that the participation constraint is relaxed. Hence, the income effect enters the
principal’s first-order condition with a positive sign.7 The income effect consists of
two terms. The first term reflects the effort effect on the net-of-tax pay-performance
sensitivity for the agent. The second term represents the higher net-of-tax revenue
from a one-unit increase in the agent’s effort. Both effects relax the principal’s
participation constraint.
• Risk effect: The fourth term indicates that higher effort implies higher uncertainty
for the agent regarding his expected salary because the salary variance increases
such that the participation constraint is tightened. It follows that the principal has
to compensate the agent with a larger risk premium to accept the higher risk, which
yields a negative sign for the risk effect in the principal’s first-order condition. It
is important to mention that the risk parameter ρ influences the magnitude of the
risk effect. If the risk parameter is zero, the risk effect will disappear. In this case,
we have already shown that the pay-performance sensitivity decreases through the
introduction of a bonus tax. Hence, the risk effect is crucial to obtaining the positive
effect of a bonus tax on the pay-performance sensitivity as derived in Proposition
2.
• Indirect marginal cost (MC) effect: The last term shows that the principal has
to compensate the agent for his higher effort costs, such that the participation
constraint is tightened. Because the agent’s costs affect the principal’s incentives,
we refer to it as the ”indirect marginal cost effect”. It should be noted that this
effect enters the principal’s first-order condition with a negative sign.
We derive that the second term of the income effect compensates for the indirect
marginal cost effect because the agent’s marginal effort costs equal the marginal revenue
7The difference between the direct marginal cost effect and income effect stems from the fact that the
state receives fraction τ of the bonus paid by the principal.
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of effort in the participation constraint. Furthermore, the second term of the direct
marginal cost effect sets off the first term of the income effect. It results in the negative
term −τa∗c′′(a∗)/(1 − τ). The intuition behind this result is that the effect of effort on
the pay-performance sensitivity is stronger in the direct marginal cost effect than it is in
the income effect. This result occurs because the principal pays the full amount of the
bonus, but the agent only receives fraction (1− τ) of it.
After rearranging equation (6), we obtain
1− γ∗ = c′′(a∗)
[
ρ(1− τ)γ∗ + a∗ τ
1− τ
]
. (7)
(ib) In a next step, we analyze the effects of a bonus tax on the principal’s first-order
condition using equation (7). It is easy to see that a higher bonus tax does not influence
the principal’s marginal revenue; the marginal revenue of effort is constant and equals
one. The effect of a higher bonus tax on the direct marginal cost effect is ambiguous,
however. Because a higher tax affects the agent’s optimal effort and the optimal pay-
performance sensitivity, it is ambiguous whether a higher tax increases or decreases the
direct marginal cost effect. A higher bonus tax decreases the income effect because the
agent’s expected net-of-tax variable salary decreases. At the same time, the risk effect
diminishes due to a lower variance in the agent’s salary because the state shares part of
the risk. Similarly, a higher bonus tax decreases the indirect marginal cost effect because
the agent reduces his effort in equilibrium.
If ρ > ργ, then the risk effect dominates the sum of the other effects. It follows that
a higher bonus tax induces the principal to increase the pay-performance sensitivity γ∗
to satisfy her first-order condition. Formally, it must be the case that the rhs of (7)
decreases in τ because the principal lowers γ∗ such that the lhs decreases. If ρ < ργ,
then the principal decreases the pay-performance sensitivity γ∗ through a higher bonus
tax because the risk effect is dominated by the sum of the other effects. Because the
principal sets a lower γ∗, it must be the case that the rhs of (7) increases in τ . Note that
if ρ = ργ, then the above mentioned effects balance each other out such that γ
∗ is not
affected by a change in the bonus tax.
(ii) We provide the intuition for the principal’s behavior with respect to the fixed
salary δ∗ as follows. The partial derivative of δ∗ with respect to τ is given by
dδ∗
dτ
= −[c′′(a∗)a∗ + (1− τ)γ∗︸ ︷︷ ︸−
income effect
ρ(1− τ)γ∗c′′(a∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
risk effect
− (1− τ)γ∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
ind. MC effect
] · da
∗
dτ︸︷︷︸
<0
.
If ρ > ρδ, then the combined risk effect and the indirect marginal cost effect dominate
the income effect such that the principal has an incentive to decrease the fixed salary in
equilibrium: that is, dδ
∗
dτ
< 0. The opposite holds true if ρ < ρδ. In this case, the principal
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has an incentive to increase the fixed salary: that is, dδ
∗
dτ
> 0. Note that if ρ = ρδ, then
δ∗ is not affected by a change in τ .
From Parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition 2, we can derive the following corollary:
Corollary 1 test
For a general cost function, the introduction of a bonus tax does not necessarily im-
ply a substitution effect between the fixed salary δ∗ and the pay-performance sensitivity
γ∗.
Because the threshold values ρδ and ργ are not necessarily equal, a substitution effect
between the fixed salary and the pay-performance sensitivity is not guaranteed. For
example, in Section 4.2, we show for a cubic cost function that a higher bonus tax can
induce a simultaneous increase in the fixed salary and the pay-performance sensitivity.
However, for a quadratic cost function the threshold values ρδ and ργ are equal such that
an increase (decrease) in γ∗ always induces a decrease (increase) in δ∗. In this case, a
substitution effect is present between δ∗ and γ∗ (see Section 3).
Regarding Part (iii) of Proposition 2, the intuition for the agent’s behavior in equi-
librium is as follows. According to the agent’s incentive compatibility constraint (5), the
marginal effort costs equal the marginal revenue of effort in equilibrium:
c′(a∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
marginal cost
= (1− τ)γ∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
marginal revenue
The direct tax effect (1− τ) has a negative effect on the marginal revenue of effort (rhs).
Based on Part (i) of Proposition 2, we know that γ∗ decreases in τ if ρ < ργ, which
further reduces the marginal revenue. It follows that marginal revenue unambiguously
decreases if the bonus tax increases. In this case, it is clear that the agent reduces
his effort in equilibrium. If ρ > ργ, then the pay-performance sensitivity γ
∗ increases
through a higher bonus tax, which results in a positive effect on the marginal revenue of
effort. However, the direct tax effect always overcompensates for a higher γ∗ such that
the marginal revenue still decreases. Also in this case, the agent will reduce his effort in
equilibrium.
In the next section, to derive further insights on bonus payments, tax revenue and
social welfare, we simplify the model and analyze a quadratic cost function. In Section 4,
we analyze the model with a general polynomial cost function and simulate it for a cubic
cost function.
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3 Quadratic Cost Function
3.1 Incentive Effects of Bonus Taxes
In this section, we analyze a quadratic cost function given by c(a) = b
2
a2 with b > 0.
This function has well-defined properties that allow us to calculate the equilibrium values
(a∗, γ∗, δ∗) in closed form.8 The following lemma provides additional insights regarding
the incentive effects of bonus taxes for a quadratic cost function:
Lemma 2 test
(i) A higher bonus tax induces the principal to increase (decrease) the pay-performance
sensitivity γ∗ with an increasing (decreasing) rate if the risk parameter ρ is sufficiently
large (small). Formally,
(
dγ∗
dτ
R 0⇔ ρ R 1
b
)
and d
2γ∗
dτ2
> 0.
(ii) An increase (decrease) in the pay-performance sensitivity γ∗ always induces a decrease
(increase) in the fixed salary δ∗; i.e., we observe a substitution effect between γ∗ and δ∗.
(iii) A higher bonus tax induces the agent to reduce equilibrium effort a∗ with an increasing
(decreasing) rate if the risk parameter ρ is sufficiently large (small). Formally, da
∗
dτ
< 0
and d
2a∗
dτ2
R 0⇔ ρ Q 1
b
.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
Part (i) analyzes the effects of bonus taxes on the principal’s behavior. Based on the
participation constraint, the incentive compatibility constraint and the quadratic cost
function, we can rearrange the principal’s first-order condition and obtain
1− 2γ∗
γ∗
= b(1− τ)
(
ρ− 1
b
)
. (8)
This equation corresponds to equation (7) in the general model. If ρ > 1/b, then the risk
effect dominates the sum of the other effects. It follows that the rhs of (8) is positive, and
therefore it decreases linearly with a higher bonus tax. Hence, the principal increases the
pay-performance sensitivity γ∗ on the lhs with a decreasing rate to satisfy her first-order
condition.9 If ρ < 1/b, then the rhs of (8) is negative. Hence, it increases with a higher
bonus tax. It follows that the principal lowers γ∗ with an increasing rate to satisfy her
first-order condition.
Part (ii) posits that, for a quadratic cost function, there is a substitution effect between
γ∗ and δ∗ because the threshold values ργ and ρδ from Proposition 2 are equal: ργ = ρδ =
1/b. That is, whenever the principal increases the pay-performance sensitivity, she will
lower the fixed salary and vice versa. In Section 4, however, we show that this substitution
effect is not necessarily present for a polynomial cost function of higher degree.
8See the proof of Lemma 2.
9Notice that γ∗ ∈ (1/2, 1) for ρ < 1/b and γ∗ ∈ (0, 1/2) for ρ > 1/b ∀τ ∈ (0, 1). Hence, (1− 2γ∗) /γ∗
on the lhs of (8) is positive for ρ > 1/b and it decreases in γ∗ with a decreasing rate.
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Part (iii) of Lemma 2 shows that the rate of change in the agent’s effort reduction
decreases with a higher bonus tax if the risk parameter is smaller than 1/b and that the
opposite holds true for ρ > 1/b. It should be noted that the agent’s optimality condition
(5) for a quadratic cost function is given by a∗ = (1− τ)γ∗/b, such that
d2a∗
dτ 2
=
1
b
(
−2dγ
∗
dτ
+ (1− τ)d
2γ∗
dτ 2
)
.
If ρ < 1/b, then the agent reduces his effort with a decreasing rate because the pay-
performance sensitivity decreases with a higher bonus tax; that is, dγ∗/dτ < 0. If, on the
other hand, ρ > 1/b, then 2 (dγ∗/dτ) > (1 − τ) (d2γ∗/dτ 2) such that the rate of change
in the agent’s effort reduction increases with a higher bonus tax.
In a next step, we analyze how strongly the agent and principal react to variations in
the risk parameter ρ. We formalize our insights in the following lemma.
Lemma 3 test
(i) Suppose that ρ˜ ≡ 3−τ
b(1−τ) ∈ (3/b,∞). A higher risk parameter ρ induces the prin-
cipal: (ia) to lower γ∗ less strongly with a higher bonus tax τ as long as ρ < 1/b; (ib) to
increase γ∗ more strongly with a higher bonus tax τ if ρ ∈ (1/b, ρ˜); and (ic) to increase
γ∗ less strongly with a higher bonus tax τ if ρ > ρ˜.
(ii) A higher risk parameter ρ induces the agent to reduce his effort a∗ less strongly with
a higher bonus tax τ .
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
Regarding Part (i), we find that a higher risk parameter ρ strengthens the risk effect
such that the rhs of (8) increases. As a result, the rhs decreases with a higher bonus tax
τ more strongly with an increasing risk parameter, ceteris paribus. Hence, as the risk
parameter increases, the principal must increase γ∗ more strongly in response to a higher
bonus tax. This behavior changes if ρ > ρ˜ because then the principal increases γ∗ less
strongly as a response to a higher τ .10
Part (ii) shows that in the case of a low risk parameter, a higher bonus tax induces
a large decrease in the agent’s effort. In contrast, in the case of a high risk parameter, a
higher bonus tax yields a low decrease in the agent’s effort.
3.2 Bonus Payment
In the next proposition, we analyze the effect of a higher bonus tax on the bonus paid by
the principal.
10Note that for large values of ρ the corresponding γ∗ is low and the marginal revenue on the lhs of
(8) is high.
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Proposition 3 (Bonus Payment) Suppose that ρ ∈ (3
b
, 5−τ
b(1−τ)).
(i) A higher bonus tax increases the expected bonus E[BP ∗] = γ∗a∗ paid by the principal
until the maximum is reached for a bonus tax given by τBP ≡ bρ−3
bρ−1 .
(ii) The agent always receives a lower expected bonus (1−τ)E[BP ∗] after the introduction
of a bonus tax.
Proof. See Appendix A.6.
Part (i) of the proposition posits that the bonus paid by the principal can increase
if these payments are taxed. This counterintuitive result emerges if the risk parameter
is sufficiently large. Recall that the agent always reduces effort a∗ with a higher bonus
tax and that the principal’s reaction depends on the risk parameter ρ. It is clear that
the bonus payment cannot increase if ρ < 1/b because, then, the principal also decreases
γ∗. Hence, a necessary condition to increase the bonus payment with a higher tax rate is
ρ > 1/b. According to the proposition, the threshold value of the risk parameter above
which the bonus payment increases with the introduction of a bonus tax, is given by
ρ = 3/b. That is, if ρ > 3/b, then the increase in the pay-performance sensitivity γ∗
compensates for the decrease in the agent’s effort level a∗. Thus, the bonus payment
increases with a higher tax until the maximum is reached for τ = τBP .11 Raising the
bonus tax above τBP decreases the bonus such that it can be even lower than in the
benchmark case without a tax.
For a given tax rate, a higher risk parameter always decreases the bonus payment (i.e.,
∂E[BP ∗]/∂ρ < 0) because both the agent’s effort and the pay-performance sensitivity
decrease with a higher ρ. However, the bonus-maximizing tax τBP increases with a higher
risk parameter because the increase in the pay-performance sensitivity offsets the decrease
in effort more easily if ρ is higher.
Part (ii) of the proposition shows that a bonus tax always reduces the expected bonus
received by the agent. As the state keeps τE[BP ∗], the agent only receives (1−τ)E[BP ∗]
of the bonus paid by the principal, which is always lower than without a tax. That is,
the tax-induced decrease in (1 − τ) always compensates for a potential increase in the
bonus paid by the principal.
11This result only holds true as long as ρ < 5−τb(1−τ) , because the principal reacts less elastic with an
increase in γ∗ if ρ increases for ρ > ρ˜ (see Part (ic) in Lemma 3).
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3.3 Tax Revenue and Social Welfare
We now turn our attention to how a bonus tax affects the state’s expected tax revenue
E[TR∗] = τγ∗a∗. The tax rate τTR, which maximizes E[TR∗], is given by12
τTR = arg max
τ∈[0,1]
E[TR∗] =
bρ+ 1
bρ+ 3
.
A higher bonus tax τ has a direct, positive effect on the tax revenue, but the expected
bonus payment γ∗a∗ only has a positive effect if ρ ∈ (3
b
, 5−τ
b(1−τ)) and if the bonus tax is
set not too high; that is, τ < τBP . The revenue-maximizing tax rate τTR is the bonus
tax for which the direct tax effect and the (eventually negative) bonus payment effect
are balanced. From the state’s viewpoint, increasing the bonus tax beyond this level is
counterproductive due to diminishing returns. Ceteris paribus, the tax revenue decreases
with a higher risk parameter (i.e., ∂E[TR∗]/∂ρ < 0) because the bonus payment decreases
with a higher ρ. Similarly to the bonus-maximizing tax rate τBP , the revenue-maximizing
tax rate τTR increases in ρ. The relationship between the expected tax revenue and the
bonus tax, which is also known as the Laffer curve, is depicted in Figure 1 for different
values of the risk parameter ρ.
Figure 1: The Effect of Bonus Taxes on Tax Revenue
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In a next step, we investigate the welfare effects of a bonus tax. By substituting the
equilibrium values (a∗, γ∗, δ∗) into the welfare function (1), we derive the expected social
welfare in equilibrium E[W ∗] as:
E[W ∗] = ω
(1− τ)τ
b [1 + τ + bρ(1− τ)]2 + (1− ω)
(1− τ)
2b [1 + τ + bρ(1− τ)]
12Note that the risk parameter has to be sufficiently low to guarantee that the expected tax revenue
has a maximum.
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We establish the following proposition:
Proposition 4 (Welfare Effect) test
(i) Suppose that ω > 1/2. The introduction of a bonus tax increases social welfare until
the maximum is reached for a bonus tax given by
τ = τW ≡ (2ω − 1)(1 + bρ)
bρ(2ω − 1) + 2ω + 1 .
(ii) Suppose that ω ≤ 1/2. The introduction of a bonus tax always decreases social welfare.
Proof. See Appendix A.7.
The proposition shows that a bonus tax decreases social welfare unless the social
planner puts a sufficiently high weight on tax revenue. If the tax revenue of the state
is more strongly weighted than the sum of the agent’s utility and principal’s profit (i.e.,
ω ∈ (0.5, 1]), then the introduction of a bonus tax can increase social welfare. In this
case, social welfare increases with a higher bonus tax until the welfare-optimal tax rate
τW is reached. However, raising the bonus tax above this level (i.e., τ > τW ) decreases
social welfare. If the bonus tax is too high, with τ > τ¯ ,13 the welfare level under a bonus
tax is then even lower than it is in the scenario without a bonus tax.
The intuition behind these results is based on the fact that the agent’s utility is
unaffected by a bonus tax because the principal offers a compensation package such that
the agent just reaches his reservation utility û. On the other hand, a bonus tax decreases
the principal’s profit but increases the state’s tax revenue until tax revenue is maximized
for τ = τTR > τW . When the state’s tax revenue is weighted less heavily than the
principal’s profit (i.e., ω ∈ [0, 0.5)), a bonus tax always decreases social welfare because
the decrease in the principal’s profit always overcompensates for the increase in tax
revenue. If ω ∈ (0.5, 1], the additional tax revenue of the state then outweighs the loss in
the principal’s profit for relatively low tax rates with τ < τW and social welfare increases.
If the tax rate increases above τW , higher tax revenue then no longer compensates for
the loss in the principal’s profit, and social welfare thus decreases. Because the revenue-
maximizing tax rate τTR increases with the risk parameter ρ, the welfare-optimal tax
rate also increases with this parameter.
4 Extensions
In this section, we extend our model to verify whether our results on the incentive effects
of bonus taxes carry over to a polynomial cost function with a degree larger than two.
13See the proof of Proposition 4 in Appendix A.7 for a derivation of τ¯ .
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4.1 Polynomial Cost Function
We assume that effort costs are given by a polynomial cost function c(a) = b
φ
aφ with b ∈
R+ and φ ∈ (2,∞). This function fulfills the properties for the cost function required in
Section 2.1. According to Proposition 1, the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium
is guaranteed, and we derive the optimality conditions as
(1− φγ∗) = [−φ(1− τ)γ∗] +
[
ρ(1− τ)γ∗b(φ− 1) (a∗)φ−2
]
+ [(1− τ)γ∗] ,
b(a∗)φ−1 = (1− τ)γ∗.
(9)
The first equation is the principal’s optimality condition, and the second equation is the
agent’s optimality condition. It should be noted that, in contrast to the quadratic effort
costs with φ = 2, the risk effect in the principal’s optimality condition given by ρ(1 −
τ)γ∗b(φ− 1) (a∗)φ−2 now depends on the agent’s effort a∗. We derive that a higher effort
level a∗, which also depends on the tax rate τ , strengthens the risk effect. Rearranging
the principal’s optimality condition yields
1− φγ∗ = γ∗(1− τ)(φ− 1)
(
b (a∗)φ−2 ρ− 1
)
.
As we cannot calculate the equilibrium values (a∗, γ∗) in closed-form, in the following
section, we simulate the system of equations (9) simultaneously.
4.2 Simulation
For the simulation, we set b = 1 and φ = 3 to obtain the cubic cost function c(a) = 1
3
a3.
Moreover, we specify the agent’s reservation utility as û = 5 and calculate the fixed
salary δ∗ from the agent’s participation constraint. Our simulation results are depicted
in Figure 2.14
Similar to a quadratic cost function, Panel (c) shows that the agent’s optimal effort
a∗ decreases with a higher bonus tax. Furthermore, the negative relationship between
effort and bonus tax is weaker with a higher risk parameter ρ. That is, for a given τ , a
higher ρ induces the agent to reduce his effort a∗ less strongly with a higher bonus tax.
In contrast to the quadratic cost function, Panel (a) shows that the relationship
between the pay-performance sensitivity γ∗ and τ is no longer monotonic, but can follow
an inverted U-shaped pattern. Furthermore, Panel (b) illustrates that the relationship
between the fixed salary δ∗ and τ can follow a U-shaped pattern. That is, there exists a
tax rate for which the pay-performance sensitivity is maximal and another tax rate for
which the fixed salary is minimal. For example, compare Figure 3, which is a rescaled
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Figure 2: Bonus Tax Effects for Polynomial Cost Functions
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(a) Effect on PPS (b) Effect on Fixed Salary
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(c) Effect on Effort
version of Figure 2, in which we focus on ρ = 2.
The pay-performance sensitivity γ∗ increases in τ until τ ≈ 0.7 and subsequently it
decreases for a higher bonus tax. The fixed salary δ∗, on the other hand, decreases in τ
until τ ≈ 0.25 and subsequently it increases for a higher bonus tax. From these results,
we derive the following lemma:
Lemma 4 test
For a polynomial cost function with a degree larger than two, a higher bonus tax can
induce a simultaneous increase in the fixed salary and the pay-performance sensitivity.
The lemma shows that we no longer observe a substitution effect between γ∗ and
δ∗. That is, we find parameter constellations in which both the fixed salary and the
pay-performance sensitivity increase with a higher bonus tax. The intuition behind these
results is as follows. Based on Proposition 2, we derive that for a cubic cost function, the
pay-performance sensitivity γ∗ increases with a higher bonus tax for
ρ > ργ =
(1− γ∗) + 2 [(a∗)2 − τγ∗]
5(a∗)3
.
14The results remain qualitatively the same for different parameter values φ > 2 and b > 0.
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Figure 3: Bonus Tax Effects on PPS and Fixed Salary
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For a low bonus tax, ργ is small and therefore γ
∗ increases with a higher bonus tax
(see Panel (a) in Figure 3). In this case, the risk effect dominates the sum of the effects
mentioned in Section 2.2. However, if the bonus tax increases, the agent’s effort decreases,
and therefore, ργ endogenously increases. If the bonus tax is larger than τ ≈ 0.7, then
ργ > 2. Therefore, the pay-performance sensitivity decreases with a higher bonus tax. In
this case, the risk effect is dominated by the sum of the other effects.
On the other hand, the fixed salary δ∗ increases with a higher bonus tax for ρ <
ρδ = 1/a
∗. For a low bonus tax, effort a∗ is relatively high and yields a relatively low ρδ.
Thus, the fixed salary δ∗ decreases with a higher bonus tax (see Panel (b) in Figure 3).
In this case, the combined risk effect and the indirect marginal cost effect dominate the
income effect such that the principal has an incentive to decrease the fixed salary δ∗. If,
however, the bonus tax increases, then the agent’s effort decreases, and ρδ endogenously
increases. If the bonus tax is larger than τ ≈ 0.25, then ρδ > 2 such that the fixed
salary δ∗ increases with a higher bonus tax. In this case, the income effect dominates
the combined risk effect and the indirect marginal cost effect; thus the principal has an
incentive to increase the fixed salary δ∗. Because ργ and ρδ are not equal for a cubic cost
function, there is a range of bonus taxes in which that the pay-performance sensitivity γ∗
and the fixed salary δ∗ increase with a higher bonus tax. This behavior is not observable
for a quadratic cost function.
5 Conclusion and Discussion
Several countries have implemented bonus taxes for corporate executives in response to
the financial crisis of 2007-2010. To fill the research gap on executive pay regulation in
general and on the effects of bonus taxes for executives in particular, this study inves-
tigated the impact of such bonus taxes in a principal-agent model. In particular, we
19
analyzed the effects of a bonus tax on the agent’s incentives to exert effort, on the com-
position of the agent’s compensation package, on the bonuses paid by the principal, on
tax revenue and on social welfare.
One justification for the regulation of executive pay through bonus taxes is the cre-
ation of incentives to substitute variable salary with fixed salary (e.g., Thanassoulis,
2009). However, our model shows that this substitution effect is not necessarily present
for a general effort cost function. In particular, it is possible that a higher bonus tax si-
multaneously increases the fixed salary component and the pay-performance sensitivity.15
A bonus tax has different effects on the fixed salary and the pay-performance sensitivity
because the principal sets an optimal compensation package on the conditions that the
agent reaches at least his reservation utility and the package is incentive compatible. To
determine the composition of the package, she anticipates that a higher bonus tax will de-
crease the agent’s expected net-of-tax variable salary (income effect), decrease the agent’s
risk premium due to a lower salary variance (risk effect) and lower the agent’s effort costs
(indirect marginal cost effect). The product of the agent’s risk aversion and the variance
of the firm value (risk parameter) plays a crucial role in determining the effect of a bonus
tax. We provided separate threshold values for the risk parameter for which a bonus tax
positively or negatively influences the fixed salary and the pay-performance sensitivity,
respectively.
Moreover, our model showed that the agent always reacts to a higher bonus tax with
lower effort. For quadratic effort costs, this tax-induced effort reduction decreases with a
higher risk parameter. Surprisingly, a higher bonus tax induces the principal to pay higher
bonuses if the risk parameter is sufficiently large. In this case, the increase in the pay-
performance sensitivity overcompensates for the decrease in the agent’s effort. Therefore,
it is not guaranteed that firms will have to pay lower bonuses after implementing a bonus
tax. Social welfare includes the state’s tax revenue as well as the sum of the agent’s
utility and the principal’s profit. The introduction of a bonus tax will decrease social
welfare unless the social planner puts a sufficiently high weight on tax revenue.
Our model yields potentially testable comparative statics results. In particular, our
model might help to predict the sectors and firms in which the redistribution target of a
bonus tax can or cannot be realized and in which bonuses would decrease or increase. In
uncertain economic environments and/or in firms, in which the monitoring and evaluation
of the manager’s performance is comparatively hard, we expect that bonus taxes will
induce a firm to pay higher bonuses. Additionally, we do not expect a bonus tax to have
the desired effect of shifting the pay-performance sensitivity towards a fixed salary. That
is, we anticipate low fixed salaries and high pay-performance sensitivities. We can derive
15For quadratic effort costs, however, we show that a substitution effect between the fixed salary
component and the pay-performance sensitivity is always present. In particular, a bonus tax can induce
a decrease in the fixed salary component and an increase in the pay-performance sensitivity.
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the following examples of firms for these predictions:
• New-economy firms: These firms tend to operate in more uncertain economic en-
vironments than old-economy firms. In addition, it might be more difficult to
observe the manager’s marginal contribution in new-economy firms because these
firms grow faster, are more R&D intensive and have larger market-to-book ratios
than old-economy firms (see Ittner et al. 2003).
• Large firms: According to Schaefer (1998), large firms have more noisy measures of
individual performance than do small firms. Moreover, in large firms, one manager’s
action has less influence on the firm value than it might in small firms.
• Privately held firms: Marino and Zabojnik (2008) suggest that it is harder for
privately held firms to evaluate their managers because a public firm’s stock price
provides an informative measure of performance which is less available in privately
held firms.
Our simple model may serve as a basic framework to analyze bonus taxes in a
principal-agent model. There is a broad range of further applications and model ex-
tensions. For instance, an interesting avenue for further research could be the extension
of our model to more than one period. An agent’s effort decisions are often connected over
time, and working contracts extend over several periods. The implementation of these dy-
namics in the model could shed more light on the impact of bonus taxes on executive pay.
Furthermore, an interesting extension would be to incorporate endogenously-determined
outside options for the agent and/or to analyze the effects of bonus taxes on executives’
risk-taking behaviors.
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A Appendix
A.1 Derivation of the Agent’s Expected Net Utility
Given the agent’s negative exponential utility function U(p) = −e−rp, we derive
E[U ] =
∫ ∞
−∞
U(p)f(p)dp =
∫ ∞
−∞
−e−rpf(p)dp = −
∫ ∞
−∞
1√
2piσp
e
− (p−p¯)2
2σ2p
−rp
dp.
Note that the agent’s salary is normally distributed with N (δ + (1− τ)γa; (1− τ)2γ2σ2ε).
It follows
E[U ] = −
∫ ∞
−∞
1√
2piσp
e
−p2+2p¯p−p¯2−2rpσ2p
2σ2p dp
= −e
r2σ2p
2
−rp¯ 1√
2piσp
∫ ∞
−∞
e
− 1
2
(p−(p¯−rσ2p))
σ2p
2
dp.︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
The second part of the above equation equals one because it corresponds to the integral
of a normal distribution function with N(p¯− rσ2p, σ2p) over the entire interval. Therefore,
E[U ] = −e r
2σ2p
2
−rp¯. By transforming this utility function with the positive monotonic
natural logarithm function and by dividing it with r, we obtain the agent’s gross utility
p¯ − rσ2p/2 with p¯ = δ + (1 − τ)γa and σ2p = γ2(1 − τ)2σ2ε .16 It follows that the agent’s
expected net utility (certainty equivalent) is given by
E[UA] = p¯−
rσ2p
2
− c(a) = δ + (1− τ)γa− rσ
2
ε
2
γ2(1− τ)2 − c(a).
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
The maximization problem of the agent is given by
max
a≥0
{
E[UA] = δ + (1− τ)γa− rσ
2
ε
2
γ2(1− τ)2 − c(a)
}
.
The corresponding first-order condition is computed as ∂E[UA]/∂a = (1−τ)γ−c′(a) = 0,
yielding the agent’s optimality condition
c′(a∗) = (1− τ)γ.
We now turn our attention to the maximization problem of the principal, which is
16Note that given the properties of exponential functions, the ordering will be preserved by using
p¯− rσ2p/2 as an equivalent utility measure.
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given by
max
(δ,γ)≥0
{E[piP ] = (1− γ)a− δ} subject to
E[UA(a)] = δ + (1− τ)γa− rσ
2
ε
2
γ2(1− τ)2 − c(a) > û and c′(a) = (1− τ)γ.
Note that the principal is able to control the agent’s effort a by choosing an adequate
pay-performance sensitivity γ. Therefore, instead of replacing a, we use the last condi-
tion (incentive compatibility constraint) and replace γ with c′(a)/(1 − τ) to set up the
associated Lagrangian LP . Then, the Lagrangian with multiplier λ has the following
form:
LP (a, δ, λ) ≡ a− ac
′(a)
1− τ − δ + λ
[
δ + c′(a)a− rσ
2
ε
2
c′(a)2 − c(a)− û
]
.
The corresponding first-order conditions are computed as
∂LP
∂a
= 1− c
′(a∗)
1− τ −
c′′(a∗)
1− τ a
∗ + λ
[
c′′(a∗)a∗ − c′(a∗)c′′(a∗)rσ2ε
]
= 0,
∂LP
∂δ
= −1 + λ = 0,
∂LP
∂λ
= δ + c′(a∗)a∗ − rσ
2
ε
2
c′(a∗)2 − c(a∗)− û = 0.
Note that the principal has an incentive to provide a compensation package such that the
participation constraint is binding, i.e., the agent receives exactly his reservation utility.
Therefore, the derivative of LP with respect to λ equals zero. With the above system,
the agent’s first-order condition c′(a∗) = (1 − τ)γ∗ and λ = 1, we derive the first-order
condition of the principal as
1− γ∗ − c
′′(a∗)
1− τ a
∗ + c′′(a∗)a∗ − (1− τ)γ∗c′′(a∗)rσ2ε = 0. (10)
To guarantee that the second-order condition for a maximum is satisfied, a lower bound
of the third derivative of the cost function is required. Formally,
c′′′(a∗) > Ψ ≡ −c′′(a∗)1 + τ + (1− τ)c
′′(a∗)rσ2ε
a∗τ + (1− τ)c′(a∗)rσ2ε
. (11)
Note that Ψ < 0, i.e., c′′′(a∗) can be negative to satisfy the second-order condition.
By solving equation (10), we obtain the optimal γ∗ as
γ∗ =
(1− τ)− a∗c′′(a∗)τ
(1− τ) [1 + (1− τ)c′′(a∗)rσ2ε ]
. (12)
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With the binding participation constraint, we derive the optimal fixed salary δ∗ as
δ∗ = û− c′(a∗)a∗ + c
′(a∗)2
2
rσ2ε + c(a
∗). (13)
In a next step, we show that the equilibrium in (γ∗, δ∗, a∗) exists and is unique.
Combining the two optimality conditions
c′(a) = (1− τ)γ and γ = (1− τ)− ac
′′(a)τ
(1− τ) [1 + (1− τ)c′′(a)rσ2ε ]
,
we obtain
1− τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡κlhs
= c′(a) + c′′(a)(aτ + (1− τ)rσ2εc′(a))︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡κrhs(a)
. (14)
Note that the left-hand side κlhs of equation (14) is independent of a. Using the assump-
tions regarding the cost function, the right-hand side κrhs(a) of equation (14) is zero for
a = 0 and we obtain κrhs(0) = 0 < (1− τ) = κlhs. We can show that κrhs(a) is a mono-
tonically increasing function in a if the requirement for c′′′(a) regarding the second-order
condition holds, i.e., c′′′(a) > Ψ (see (11)). Formally,
∂κrhs(a)
∂a
> 0⇐⇒ c′′′(a) > −c′′(a)1 + τ + (1− τ)c
′′(a)rσ2ε
aτ + (1− τ)c′(a)rσ2ε
Using the assumption lim
a→∞
c′(a) = ∞, it is guaranteed that κrhs(a) passes the constant
κlhs for a certain effort a = a
∗. Hence, there exist exactly one intersection, which defines
the unique equilibrium a∗. Plugging a∗ into (12) and (13) yields the other equilibrium
values (γ∗, δ∗). Note that the weaker assumption lim
a→∞
c′(a) > (1− τ) would be sufficient
to guarantee the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
ad (i) and (iii): We use the optimality conditions
c′(a∗) = (1− τ)γ∗ and γ∗ = (1− τ)− a
∗c′′(a∗)τ
(1− τ) [1 + (1− τ)c′′(a∗)ρ] ,
rearrange them and obtain
g1(a
∗, γ∗, τ) := c′(a∗)− (1− τ)γ∗ = 0,
g2(a
∗, γ∗, τ) := (1− τ)− a∗c′′(a∗)τ − γ∗(1− τ) [1 + (1− τ)c′′(a∗)ρ] = 0.
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Next, we derive the total differential of g1(a
∗, γ∗, τ) = 0 and g2(a∗, γ∗, τ) = 0:
∂g1
∂a∗
da∗ +
∂g1
∂γ∗
dγ∗ +
∂g1
∂τ
dτ = 0,
∂g2
∂a∗
da∗ +
∂g2
∂γ∗
dγ∗ +
∂g2
∂τ
dτ = 0.
The total differential can also be written as[
g1a g1γ
g2a g2γ
][
da∗
dγ∗
]
=
[
−g1τ
−g2τ
]
dτ, (15)
where
g1a =
∂g1
∂a∗
= c′′(a∗), g1γ =
∂g1
∂γ∗
= −(1− τ), g1τ = ∂g1
∂τ
= γ∗,
g2a =
∂g2
∂a∗
= − [τc′′(a∗) + c′′′(a∗)(a∗τ + (1− τ)2γ∗ρ)] ,
g2γ =
∂g2
∂γ∗
= −(1− τ) [1 + ρ(1− τ)c′′(a∗)] ,
g2τ =
∂g2
∂τ
= γ∗ − 1− c′′(a∗) [a∗ − 2γ∗ρ(1− τ)] .
(16)
Applying Cramer’s Rule to (15), we derive
da∗
dτ
=
g1γg2τ − g2γg1τ
g1ag2γ − g1γg2a and
dγ∗
dτ
=
g2ag1τ − g1ag2τ
g1ag2γ − g1γg2a . (17)
Plugging (16) into (17), we obtain
da∗
dτ
=
c′′(a∗) [(1− τ)γ∗ρ− a∗]− 1
µ
,
dγ∗
dτ
=
γ∗(a∗τ + ρ(1− τ)2γ∗)c′′′(a∗)− c′′(a∗) [1− (1 + τ)γ∗ + (a∗ − 2ρ(1− τ)γ∗)c′′(a∗)]
(1− τ)µ ,
with µ ≡ c′′(a∗) [1 + τ + (1− τ)c′′(a∗)ρ] + c′′′(a∗) [a∗τ + (1− τ)2γ∗ρ]. We derive
dγ∗
dτ
= 0⇔ ρ = ργ ≡ c
′′(a∗)(1− (1 + τ)γ∗ + c′′(a∗)a∗)− τγ∗c′′′(a∗)a∗
c′(a∗) [2c′′(a∗)2 + c′(a∗)c′′′(a∗)]
.
It is easy to show that d[dγ
∗/dτ ]
dρ
> 0, i.e., dγ
∗
dτ
is a monotonically increasing function in ρ.
It follows that
dγ∗
dτ
R 0⇔ ρ R ργ.
This proves Part (i) of the proposition.
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Regarding the agent’s optimal effort a∗, with c′′′(a∗) > Ψ, it formally holds
da∗
dτ
R 0⇔ ρ R ρa ≡ 1 + c
′′(a∗)a∗
c′(a∗)c′′(a∗)
. (18)
At first glance, given that the risk parameter is sufficiently large, i.e., ρ > ρa, it is possible
that the agent exerts more effort in equilibrium if the bonus tax increases. However,
extensive numerical simulations for different (convex) cost functions c(a) have shown
that ρ > ρa can never be satisfied in equilibrium.
17
To formally prove this claim, we provide a proof by contradiction to show that the
agent always reduces his effort with a higher bonus tax. Suppose that da
∗
dτ
≥ 0. This as-
sumption directly implies that dγ
∗
dτ
> 0 because c′(a∗) = (1− τ)γ∗.18 By using the partici-
pation constraint and the incentive compatibility constraint, we rearrange the principal’s
first-order condition and obtain19
1− γ∗ = c′′(a∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
not dec. in τ
[ρ c′(a∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
not dec. in τ
+ a∗︸︷︷︸ ·
not dec. in τ
τ
(1− τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
inc. in τ
]. (19)
Under the assumption da
∗
dτ
≥ 0, the rhs of (19) increases with a higher bonus tax τ . It
follows that γ∗ on the lhs, which is by definition in the interval (0, 1), must decrease (i.e.,
dγ∗
dτ
< 0) to guarantee also an increase of the lhs. This result, however, contradicts the
assumption da
∗
dτ
≥ 0, which implies dγ∗
dτ
> 0. Hence, our assumption was wrong and it
must be the case that da
∗
dτ
< 0. This proves Part (iii) of the proposition.
ad (ii) Based on the optimality condition regarding the fixed salary δ∗ = û−c′(a∗)a∗+
c′(a∗)2
2
ρ+ c(a∗), we compute
dδ∗
dτ
=
da∗
dτ
c′′(a∗) [ρc′(a∗)− a∗] .
With da
∗
dτ
< 0, we derive
dδ∗
dτ
Q 0⇔ ρ R ρδ ≡ a
∗
c′(a∗)
.
This proves Part (ii) and completes the proof of the proposition.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 2
According to Proposition 1, the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium is guaranteed
for the quadratic cost function c(a) = (b/2) · a2. Substituting this cost function into the
optimality conditions of Proposition 1, we compute the optimal compensation package
17Note that the optimal effort a∗ on the rhs of (18) also depends on the risk parameter ρ.
18A higher bonus tax decreases the rhs of this equation and a necessary condition to guarantee an
increase of the lhs is dγ
∗
dτ > 0.
19See also the discussion after Proposition 2.
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(γ∗, δ∗) as
γ∗ =
1
1 + τ + bρ(1− τ) and δ
∗ = û− (1− bρ)(1− τ)
2
2b [1 + τ + bρ(1− τ)]2 .
In equilibrium, the agent’s effort a∗ yields
a∗ =
1− τ
b [1 + τ + bρ(1− τ)] .
ad (i) and (ii): We compute the partial derivatives of γ∗ and δ∗ with respect to τ as
dγ∗
dτ
= − 1− bρ
[1 + τ + bρ(1− τ)]2 R 0⇔ ρ R
1
b
and
dδ∗
dτ
=
2(1− τ)(1− bρ)
b [1 + τ + bρ(1− τ)]3 R 0⇔ ρ Q
1
b
.
If ρ > 1
b
, then a higher tax rate τ increases γ∗ and decreases δ∗. If ρ < 1
b
, then a higher
tax rate τ decreases γ∗ and increases δ∗. This shows the substitution effect between the
fixed salary and the pay-performance sensitivity. Moreover, we compute
d2γ∗
dτ 2
=
2(1− bρ)2
[1 + τ + bρ(1− τ)]3 > 0.
Hence, the principal increases (decreases) γ∗ with an increasing (decreasing) rate if ρ >
1/b (ρ < 1/b).
ad (iii): We compute the first and second partial derivatives of a∗ with respect to τ
as
da∗
dτ
= − 2
b [1 + τ + bρ(1− τ)]2 < 0 and
d2a∗
dτ 2
=
4(1− bρ)
b [1 + τ + bρ(1− τ)]3 R 0⇔ ρ Q
1
b
.
A.5 Proof of Lemma 3
ad (i): To derive how strongly the principal reacts to variations in the risk parameter ρ,
we compute
d2γ∗
dτdρ
=
b [3− τ − bρ(1− τ)]
[1 + τ + bρ(1− τ)]3 R 0⇔ ρ Q ρ˜ ≡
3− τ
b(1− τ) ∈ (3/b,∞).
Hence, a higher risk parameter ρ induces the principal (ia) to decrease γ∗ less strongly
with τ as long as ρ < 1/b, (ib) to increase γ∗ more strongly with τ if ρ ∈ (1/b, ρ˜), and
(ic) to increase γ∗ less strongly with τ if ρ > ρ˜.
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ad (ii): For the agent, we derive
d2a∗
dτdρ
=
4(1− τ)
[1 + τ + bρ(1− τ)]3 > 0 ∀ρ > 0.
Hence, a higher risk parameter ρ induces the agent to decrease his effort a∗ less strongly
with τ .
A.6 Proof of Proposition 3
ad (i): The partial derivative of the expected bonus E[BP ∗] = γ∗a∗ (paid by the principal)
with respect to τ is given by
∂E[BP ∗]
∂τ
=
τ − 3 + bρ(1− τ)
b [1 + τ + bρ(1− τ)]3 = 0⇔ τ = τ
BP ≡ bρ− 3
bρ− 1 .
If ρ < 1/b, then E[BP ∗] is a convex function in τ and hence has it a minimum at τ = τBP .
If ρ ∈ (1
b
, 5−τ
b(1−τ)), then E[BP
∗] is a concave function in τ and hence it has a maximum
at τ = τBP . Moreover, we derive that for ρ ∈ (1/b, 3/b) the tax rate τBP is negative and
for ρ < 1/b or ρ > 3/b, τBP is positive. It follows that the risk parameter ρ has to be in
the interval (3
b
, 5−τ
b(1−τ)) to guarantee that the bonus paid by the principal increases with a
higher tax rate until the maximum is reached for τ = τBP .
ad (ii): The partial derivative of the expected bonus (1− τ)E[BP ∗] (received by the
agent) with respect to τ is given by
∂ ((1− τ)E[BP ∗])
∂τ
= − 4(1− τ)
b [1 + τ + bρ(1− τ)]3 < 0.
Hence, the bonus received by the agent always decreases with a higher bonus tax.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 4
Maximizing social welfare W ∗ with respect to τ , yields the following first-order condi-
tion:20
∂W ∗
∂τ
= ω
1− 3τ + bρ(1− τ)
b [1 + τ + bρ(1− τ)]3 − (1− ω)
1
b [1 + τ + bρ(1− τ)]2 = 0.
We derive
∂W ∗
∂τ
= 0⇔ τ = τW ≡ (2ω − 1)(1 + bρ)
bρ(2ω − 1) + 2ω + 1
Hence, the welfare-maximizing tax rate τW depends on the specific weight ω. We derive
that ω ∈ (0.5, 1] guarantees that τW is in the interval of feasible tax rates, i.e., τW ∈ (0, 1).
20Note that the second-order condition for a maximum is satisfied.
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It follows that social welfare increases with a higher bonus tax and reaches its maximum
for τ = τW . If ω ∈ [0, 0.5] then social welfare always decreases with a higher bonus tax.
Next, we analyze whether the welfare level with tax rate W (τ) exceeds the welfare
level without tax rate W (0). We derive
W (τ) = W (0)⇔
(
τ1 = 0 ∨ τ2 = (2ω − 1)(1 + bρ)
bρ(2ω − 1) + 1
)
.
We define τ2 ≡ τ¯ . Thus, W (τ) > W (0) ⇔ τ ∈ (0, τ¯). Moreover, we deduce that τ¯ is
in the interval of feasible tax rates if ω ∈ (0.5, 1] and it further holds τW < τ¯ .
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